Bava Kamma 204
ליקח לו חטין ולקח מהם שעורין שעורין ולקח מהם חטין תניא חדא אם פחתו פחתו לו ואם הותירו הותירו לו ותני חדא אם פחתו פחתו לו ואם הותירו הותירו לאמצע
to buy wheats and he bought with it barley, or barley and he bought with it wheat,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' With the understanding that the Profit if any will be shared equally by principal and agent. ');"><sup>1</sup></span> it was taught in one Baraitha that 'if there was a loss, the loss would be sustained by him,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., the agent. ');"><sup>2</sup></span>
אמר רבי יוחנן לא קשיא הא ר"מ והא רבי יהודה
and so also if there was a profit, the profit would be enjoyed by him,'<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., the agent. ');"><sup>2</sup></span> but in another Baraitha it was taught that 'if there was a loss, he would sustain the loss, but if there was a profit, the profit would be divided between them.'<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., between principal and agent in accordance with the original arrangement. ');"><sup>3</sup></span>
הא ר"מ דאמר שינוי קונה והא רבי יהודה דאמר שינוי אינו קונה
[Why this difference of opinion?] — Said R. Johanan: There is no difficulty, as one<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., the former Baraitha. ');"><sup>4</sup></span> was in accordance with R. Meir and the other with R. Judah; the former was in accordance with R. Meir who said<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In the case of wool given to a dyer to dye red and he dyed it black, as supra p. 586. ');"><sup>5</sup></span>
מתקיף לה ר' אלעזר ממאי דלמא עד כאן לא קאמר ר"מ אלא במידי דחזי ליה לגופיה אבל לסחורה לא אמר
that a change transfers ownership,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' From which it would follow that on account of the change in the object purchased the ownership of it passed over to the agent who would thus enjoy the whole of any profit derived. ');"><sup>6</sup></span> whereas the latter was in accordance with R. Judah who said<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In the case of wool given to a dyer to dye red and he dyed it black, as supra p. 586. ');"><sup>5</sup></span>
אלא א"ר אלעזר הא והא ר' מאיר ולא קשיא כאן לאכילה כאן לסחורה
that a change does not transfer ownership.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' So that the principal is thus entitled to share any profit that may result from the transaction, though in the case of a loss he can back out and put it completely on the agent as he acted not in accordance with his mandate. ');"><sup>7</sup></span> R. Eleazar demurred: Whence [can you know this]? May it not be perhaps that R. Meir meant his view to apply only to a matter which was intended to be used by the owner personally,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Such as wool to be used for his own garment, and a chair for his own use, as supra p. 586. ');"><sup>8</sup></span>
מחכו עלה במערבא לר' יוחנן אליבא דר' יהודה וכי מי הודיעו לבעל חטין שיקנה חטין לבעל מעות מתקיף לה רב שמואל בר ססרטי אי הכי אפילו חטין וחטין נמי לא
but in regard to matters of merchandise<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As was the case here with the wheat or barley. ');"><sup>9</sup></span> he would not say so?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For in such a case where the principal was merely out for profit he surely did not intend to distinguish between the objects of the purchase. ');"><sup>10</sup></span>
אמר רבי אבהו שאני חטין וחטין דשליחותיה קא עביד וכי בעל הבית דמי
— R. Eleazar therefore said that one as well as the other [Baraitha] might be in accordance with R. Meir, and there would still be no difficulty as the former dealt with a case where the grain was bought for domestic food,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Which is on a par with the case of wool and where a change transfers ownership; v. n. 2. ');"><sup>11</sup></span> whereas in the latter<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Stating that the profit would be divided between principal and agent. ');"><sup>12</sup></span>
תדע דתנן אחד המקדיש נכסיו ואחד המעריך את עצמו אין לו בכסות אשתו ולא בכסות בניו ולא בצבע שצבע לשמן ולא בסנדלים חדשים שלקחן לשמן
it was bought for merchandise.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. supra n. 6. ');"><sup>13</sup></span> Moreover, in the West they were even amused<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. Sanh. 17b. ');"><sup>14</sup></span>
ואמאי לימא הכא נמי מי הודיעו לצבע שיקנה צבעו לאשה אלא לאו משום דאמרינן [דשליחותיה קא עביד וכיד אשתו דמי הכא נמי] שליחותיה קא עביד וכיד בעה"ב דמי
at the statement of R. Johanan regarding the view of R. Judah.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' So that the principal is thus entitled to share any profit that may result from the transaction, though in the case of a loss he can back out and put it completely on the agent as he acted not in accordance with his mandate. ');"><sup>7</sup></span> for [they said] who was it that informed the vendor of the wheat so that he might transfer the ownership of the wheat to the owner of the money?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Why then should the wheat not altogether be the property of the agent since he acted ultra vires and thus set aside the mandate. ');"><sup>15</sup></span>
א"ר אבא לא כל המקדיש נכסיו אין דעתו על כסות אשתו ובניו
R. Samuel b. Sasarti demurred: If so, why not also say the same even in the case where wheat [was wanted by the principal] and wheat [was bought by the agent]?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Since the vendor had no knowledge of the existence of the contract of agency between the purchaser and the principal. ');"><sup>16</sup></span> — R. Abbahu however said: The case where wheat [was wanted] and wheat [was bought] is different, as in this case the agent was acting for the principal upon the terms of his mandate and it is the same [in law] as if the principal himself had done it.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Whereas in the case before us where the agent acted against the instructions, the mandate has thereby been set aside and the purchase could no more be ascribed to the principal. ');"><sup>17</sup></span>
מתקיף לה רבי זירא וכי דעתו של אדם על תפיליו ותנן המקדיש נכסיו מעלין לו תפילין א"ל אביי אין דעתו של אדם על תפילין המקדיש נכסיו סבר מצוה קא עבידנא ואין דעתו של אדם על כסות אשתו ובניו משום איבה
This could even be proved from what we have learnt: Neither in the case of one who has declared his possessions consecrated nor in the case of one who has dedicated the valuation of himself<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lev. XXVII, 1 ff. ');"><sup>18</sup></span> can the Temple treasurer claim either the garments of the wife or the garments of the children<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Cf. supra p. 46. ');"><sup>19</sup></span>
מתקיף לה רב אושעיא והלא חייבי ערכין שנו כאן ותנן חייבי ערכין ממשכנין אותן
or the articles which were dyed for them or the new foot-wear bought for them.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' 'Ar. VI, 5. ');"><sup>20</sup></span> Now, why not ask here also: Who informed the dyer that he was transferring the ownership of his dye to the wife?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' But if the ownership of the dye was transferred to the husband and not to his wife, why then should the Temple treasurer have no claim on it. ');"><sup>21</sup></span>
וכי דעתו של אדם על עצמו למשכנו
But must we not then answer that since the husband was acting on behalf of his wife it is considered as if this was done by the actual hand of the wife? [If so,] also there as the agent was acting upon a mandate<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And not ultra vires. ');"><sup>22</sup></span> it is considered as if the purchase of the wheat had been done by the actual hand of the principal. R. Abba, however, said: No; it was because when a man declares his possessions sacred, he has no intention to include the garments of his wife and children.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Cf. supra p. 46. ');"><sup>19</sup></span>
אלא אמר רבי אבא כל המקדיש נכסיו נעשה כמי שהקנה להן כסות אשתו ובניו מעיקרא
R. Zera demurred: Could it be said that in such circumstances a man would include in his mind even his <i>Tefillin</i>,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., Phylacteries; cf. Deut. VI. 8. ');"><sup>23</sup></span> and we have nevertheless learnt that 'in the case of one who declares his possessions sacred, even his <i>Tefillin</i> would have to be included in the estimate'?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' 'Ar. 23b. V. B.B. (Sonc. ed.) p. 652, n. 11. ');"><sup>24</sup></span>
תנו רבנן הלוקח שדה בשם חבירו אין כופין אותו למכור ואם אמר לו על מנת כופין אותו למכור
— Abaye, however, said to him: Yes, it is quite possible that a man may in his mind include even his <i>Tefillin</i>, as he who declares his possessions consecrated surely thinks that he is performing a commandment,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Which in his view outweighs that of Deut. VI, 8. ');"><sup>25</sup></span> but no man would in his mind include the garments of his wife and children as this would create ill feeling.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And thus counteract the very purpose and function of sanctity and Sanctuary; Isa. LXI, 8 and Mal. I, 13; Mak. 11a. ');"><sup>26</sup></span>
מאי קאמר אמר רב ששת ה"ק הלוקח שדה מחבירו בשם ריש גלותא אין כופין אותו ריש גלותא למכור ואם אמר על מנת כופין את ריש גלותא למכור
R. Oshaia demurred: Was this not stated here as applying also to liabilities for vows of value, regarding which case we have learnt that those who have incurred liabilities for vows of value can be forced to give a pledge,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' 'Ar. 21a, supra 40a. ');"><sup>27</sup></span> though it could hardly be said that it was in the mind of a man that the giving of a pledge should be enforced upon himself? — R. Abba therefore said: One who declares his possessions consecrated is regarded as having from the very beginning transferred the ownership of the garments of his wife and children to them.
אמר מר הלוקח שדה בשם ריש גלותא אין כופין אותו ריש גלותא למכור מכלל דמקנא קניא ליה לימא פליגא דבני מערבא דאמרי וכי מי הודיעו לבעל חטין שיקנה חטין לבעל הבית
Our Rabbis taught: If one man buys a field in the name of another, he cannot compel the latter to sell it to him; but if he explicitly made this stipulation with the vendor he could force him to sell. What does this mean? Said R. Shesheth: What is meant is this: If one man buys a field from another in the name of the Exilarch,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' He asked him to draw up the deed in the name of the Exilarch for the purpose of frightening away possible disputants. ');"><sup>28</sup></span> he cannot subsequently force the Exilarch to sell it to him,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., to draw up a new deed in the name of the actual purchaser. ');"><sup>29</sup></span>
אי משום הא לא קשיא כגון דאודעיה לבעל שדה ואודעינהו לסהדי
but if [when buying it] he explicitly made this stipulation<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' To the vendor. ');"><sup>30</sup></span> he could compel the Exilarch to sell it.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., to draw up a new deed in the name of the actual purchaser. ');"><sup>29</sup></span>
אלא אימא סיפא על מנת כופין אותו ריש גלותא למכור אמאי ולימא ריש גלותא לא יקרייכו בעינא ולא זילותייכו בעינא
The Master stated: 'If one buys a field in the name of the Exilarch, he cannot subsequently force the Exilarch to sell it', thus implying that he<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., the actual purchaser. ');"><sup>31</sup></span> would surely acquire title to it.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Though the deed was drawn up in the name of the Exilarch. ');"><sup>32</sup></span>
אלא אמר אביי ה"ק הלוקח שדה בשם חבירו (ריש גלותא)
Shall we say that this differs from the view of the scholars of the West<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. supra p. 594. ');"><sup>33</sup></span> who stated: Who indeed informed the vendor of the wheat so that he may transfer the ownership of the wheat to the owner of the money? — As far as that goes there would be no difficulty, as this could hold good where e.g., the vendee made this known to the owner of the field and also informed the witnesses [who signed the deed] about it. Read, however, the concluding clause: '[But if when buying it he explicitly made] this stipulation<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' To the vendor. ');"><sup>30</sup></span> he cold compel the Exilarch to sell it.'<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., to draw up a new deed in the name of the actual purchaser. ');"><sup>29</sup></span> But why should it be so? Why should the Exilarch not be entitled to say: 'I want neither your compliments<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In drawing up the deed in my name. ');"><sup>34</sup></span> nor your insults.'<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In making me appear as a dealer in land. ');"><sup>35</sup></span> Abaye therefore said: what was meant was this: If one buys a field in the name of another